Do Sanctions Work? Iran, Proliferation, and U.S. Policy

With the recent talk in Washington about instituting new sanctions against Syria, I decided to post an article originally posted on The Huffington Post last year. The below article discusses the efficacy of sanctions as they apply to the Iranian situation, but there is cross-applicability.

A diplomatic resolution to the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States is certainly the most desirable outcome. There is, however, a definite possibility that before a diplomatic solution is reached the United States, either alone or in conjunction with its allies, will impose further sanctions against Iran as a way of preventing the possible future development of nuclear weapons. As a result, it is necessary to examine various types of sanctions and their potential efficacy regarding Iran. If sanctions are enacted, then it will be necessary to institute a program that carries the least potential for unintended consequences. This report briefly compares two different forms of sanctions, and makes a tentative assessment about which types of sanctions could be applied to Iran with the most positive results. For the purposes of the comparison, sanctions are examined in a vacuum, which allows for the pros and cons of the two types of sanctions to be weighed without outside influences. In order to achieve this aim, selective sanctions, rather than broad-based sanctions, are the best option.

In the most recent edition of Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, the book’s authors define sanctions as “the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations” (Hufbauer, Schott, & Elliot 2007, p. 3). Sanctions are punitive, non-military actions taken by a sender state against a recipient state. Sanctions are also a game of “issue linkage,” where the different actors may not be wholly cognizant of the others goals and desired outcomes (Lacy, 2004, pp. 25-26). Sanctions create a pseudo-dialogue in the arenas of economics and trade between the sender state and the recipient state. Despite often being viewed as a purely punitive measure, the actual purpose of sanctions is to achieve a change in policy or behavior is the overall purpose of sanctions, and not to inflict pain. While this is a general definition of sanctions, it is useful to delineate between broad-based economic and selective sanctions.

Stuxnet Targeted Five Iranian Sites

A new report released by the computer security company Symantec states that the Stuxnet computer virus targeted “five industrial facilities” within Iran. The Natanz enrichment facility was the most likely the ultimate target of the Stuxnet malware.

The virus appears to have succeeded in infiltrating the Natanz facility. In 2009, international inspectors reported that around 1,000 centrifuges, used to enrich uranium, were offline. The virus appears to have attacked the same facility again in April 2010.

The second attack may have also been successful in hurting Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In January, the outgoing Mossad chief Meir Dagan informed the Israeli Knesset that Iran would not be able to produce a nuclear weapon until 2015. Dagan’s announcement was a stark departure from the previous Israeli position that Iran was on the cusp of developing a nuclear weapon.

The New York Times reported in January that Stuxnet appears to have been a joint U.S.-Israeli project. The virus was most likely tested on a group of isolated P-1 centrifuges located at Israel’s Dimona nuclear facility. The P-1 is the type of centrifuge used in the Iranian nuclear program. The Symantec report echoes the theory that Stuxnet’s developers used a “mirrored environment” to develop and test the virus.

Stuxnet works by exploiting four “zero-day” vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows software used to run Siemens’ equipment that controls industrial processes. Zero-day vulnerabilities are gaps in a computer program’s security that were previously unknown. The type of Siemens’ industrial equipment that the malware targets is of the same as what is used in the Natanz facility.

During the last years of the Bush administration, Israel requested military equipment from the United States, including bunker buster bombs, which could have been used in an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. President Bush did, however, authorize covert action to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program.

The rational behind Stuxnet’s development and use may have been to avoid an Israeli military attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, which would have massive repercussions for U.S. interests in the region. The U.S. government most likely viewed Stuxnet as an effective alternative that would both hinder Tehran and provide Washington with ammunition to stall an Israeli attack.

However, some computer security experts are concerned about the possibility of equally damaging blowback from the Stuxnet attack. Now that the virus has been released into the world it provides a blueprint for other countries or non-state actors to develop and use a Stuxnet-esque virus against vulnerable targets in the United States.

Pausing to Think: The U.S.-Saudi Arms Deal

This is a [bad] idea. You know why? Because it’s really obviously a [bad] idea.
– Jim, 28 Days Later

On October 20^th, the Obama administration notified congress about a $60 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia. The U.S.-Saudi deal, which primarily consisted of offensive weapons systems, passed its 30-day review period without any real consideration of some of the possible consequences of the sale and the faulty logic that is, at least partly, behind the deal.

Despite the Obama administration’s hemming and hawing on the subject, the deal is meant to contain Iran and signal that Tehran makes itself more insecure by not being transparent regarding its nuclear program. In addition, the arms deal is meant to aid the Saudi government in fighting the Yemeni Houthi rebels, who the United States, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have claimed are an Iranian proxy.

Certainly the administration has additional motivations for negotiating the deal but the reasons pertaining to Iran are problematic.

First, claims that the Houthi rebels are an Iranian proxy are questionable. The simple fact that the Houthis are Zaidi Shi’ites does not necessarily mean that they are connected to the Shi’a government in Tehran.

Second, selling $60 billion in military hardware to one of Iran’s regional rivals may not be the best strategy for convincing Tehran that it will be made more secure by cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency and forgoing a nuclear weapons program. Countries are often loath to accede to demands under duress, and recent history shows this to be especially true of Iran.

If Washington is looking to both send Iran a message that nuclear weapons will not make it safer and to make Riyadh feel more secure vis-à-vis Tehran, a better plan would have been to sell primarily defensive systems. A massive build-up of Saudi Arabia’s offensive capability sends a different message to Iran.

It is possible that the regime in Iran will feel increasingly insecure, with a freshly armed Saudi Arabia and U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. This could lead to the unfortunate situation where aggressive attempts to persuade Iran to give up the bomb may be precisely the thing that pushes Iran to go nuclear.

Finally, the Middle East is a region in flux, socially, politically, economically, and security-wise, and the last thing the doctor ordered is an injection armaments. Between U.S. arms sales to Israel and this current deal with Saudi Arabia, there is the very real danger of sparking a regional arms race.

Selling Saudi Arabia, or any country for that matter, $60 billion in high-tech, offensive weaponry without any public debate about possible consequences is always a bad idea.