Do Sanctions Work? Iran, Proliferation, and U.S. Policy

With the recent talk in Washington about instituting new sanctions against Syria, I decided to post an article originally posted on The Huffington Post last year. The below article discusses the efficacy of sanctions as they apply to the Iranian situation, but there is cross-applicability.

A diplomatic resolution to the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States is certainly the most desirable outcome. There is, however, a definite possibility that before a diplomatic solution is reached the United States, either alone or in conjunction with its allies, will impose further sanctions against Iran as a way of preventing the possible future development of nuclear weapons. As a result, it is necessary to examine various types of sanctions and their potential efficacy regarding Iran. If sanctions are enacted, then it will be necessary to institute a program that carries the least potential for unintended consequences. This report briefly compares two different forms of sanctions, and makes a tentative assessment about which types of sanctions could be applied to Iran with the most positive results. For the purposes of the comparison, sanctions are examined in a vacuum, which allows for the pros and cons of the two types of sanctions to be weighed without outside influences. In order to achieve this aim, selective sanctions, rather than broad-based sanctions, are the best option.

In the most recent edition of Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, the book’s authors define sanctions as “the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations” (Hufbauer, Schott, & Elliot 2007, p. 3). Sanctions are punitive, non-military actions taken by a sender state against a recipient state. Sanctions are also a game of “issue linkage,” where the different actors may not be wholly cognizant of the others goals and desired outcomes (Lacy, 2004, pp. 25-26). Sanctions create a pseudo-dialogue in the arenas of economics and trade between the sender state and the recipient state. Despite often being viewed as a purely punitive measure, the actual purpose of sanctions is to achieve a change in policy or behavior is the overall purpose of sanctions, and not to inflict pain. While this is a general definition of sanctions, it is useful to delineate between broad-based economic and selective sanctions.

Iran “Stars” in Second Cyber Attack

Iranian government computer networks have apparently been attacked a second time by a computer virus. The commander of Iran’s civil defense organization, Gholam-Reza Jalali, was quoted by Agence France-Presse as saying, “In the initial stage, the damage is low and it is likely to be mistaken for governmental executable files.”

Reuters reported that Iranian experts are currently investigating the new virus, named Stars, and have discovered that the virus works with the Iranian computer system.

So far, Iranian officials have been quiet about the target of the Stars virus and the extent of the malware infection. The earlier cyber attack by Stuxnet targeted Iran’s centrifuges, knocking a number of them offline. 

Iran was the target of a previous cyber attack by the Stuxnet virus, which Iranian authorities have claimed was a joint U.S.-Israeli project.

While Stuxnet did damage some of Iran’s centrifuges, it did not appear to do as much damage as was originally thought. It is possible that the Stars virus is a second attempt to halt Iran’s enrichment program, which Tehran claims is for peaceful purposes but many Western countries fear will lead to a nuclear weapon.

UNIFIL: Escape Valve in the South

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) gets abused by both Israel and Hezbollah. According to its most recent mandate (UNSC Res. 1701), UNIFIL’s official mission is to monitor the Blue Line, assist the Lebanese Armed Forces, and generally maintain security. I would suggest that the force’s most important, if unofficial, role is to function as an escape valve for local tensions.

The UN forces in southern Lebanon operate along the Israel-Lebanon border, south of the Litani River. Originally placed there in 1978, UNIFIL’s mandate was updated and enhanced following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict. Since that time, the force has been criticized by both sides. 

Hezbollah has suggested that UNIFIL is a pawn of Israel. Media outlets close to Hezbollah have also published criticisms of the UNIFIL force. An article in al-Safir, which is close to Hezbollah, commented, “UNIFIL troops are ignoring the negative impact that some of their actions have on people, in particular when they conduct themselves as if they are Israeli spies…Does UNIFIL protect the south or Israel?”

In addition, the international force has also been criticized for overstepping its bounds. After a 2009 incident in the southern village of Khirbet Selm, a Hezbollah supporter stated that UNIFIL faces two choices: “either to be neutral and help Lebanon, or to side with Israel and comply with its demands – in which case they will immediately become a hostile force…There is no third option.”

It is also not always words that are hurled at the UNIFIL force. Residents of towns in southern Lebanon have also attacked the peace keepers, including smashing windows on UN vehicles, slashing tires, and grabbing weapons from peace keepers.

The UNIFIL force also gets attacked from the Israeli side as well. Recently, UNIFIL troops were assaulted with stones thrown from across the Israeli border. In 2006, Ehud Olmert described UNIFIL as “very useless and very helpless.” Around the same time, former Israeli diplomat Itamar Rabinovich said, “UNIFIL, I’m afraid, is a joke…They’ve been there for 26 years and since then, there have been so many skirmishes.”

An Al Jazeera article from last year summed up the predicament that UNIFIL finds itself in:

Both Israel and Hezbollah…have stepped up their accusations against [UNIFIL]. Israel is again accusing the peacekeeping forces of failing to prevent, if not of collaborating with, Hezbollah in its replenishment of its military power in south Lebanon. Hezbollah, meanwhile, believes that “certain contingents” of [UNIFIL] are spying for, if not assisting, Israel.

The UNIFIL force is a punching bag for Hezbollah, Israel, and local residents. UNIFIL’s presence in the contentious south of Lebanon places it squarely in the cross-hairs of both Israel and Hezbollah, each with their own objectives. A case could be made that the international force does help keep at least a fragile peace. Both sides can blame the UN force for not doing its job properly or overstepping its authority, instead of blaming each other. UNIFIL helps defray the tension.

In many ways, the UNIFIL force does what a peacekeeping force should do; it positions itself in between two hostile forces and attempts to maintain security. Failing that, it provides a convenient target for each side to vent their frustrations towards, which helps avoid escalations in tensions.

Of course, the force has neither the mandate nor the power to truly prevent conflicts if either side decides to make a go of it. But its presence does decrease the frequency of violence.

Memories of Syria

As we shook hands he said, “Call me Mr. Omar.” Mr. Omar smoked Marlboro Red’s. Mr. Omar had picked up the little English he knew from other tourists. Mr. Omar was ten teeth short of a smile. Mr. Omar had an infectious laugh and smile; he did both a lot. Mr. Omar was the man who drove us from our hostel in the Syrian city of Hama to the ruins of Palmyra.

This was definitely not Mr. Omar’s first trip taking tourists to see Palmyra in central Syria. When my companions and I asked, he stopped obligingly in the middle of the desert so we could take pictures of sand. After we arrived at Palmyra, he dropped us off at the beginning of the ruins and pointed to the small town some ways away and said, “after the museum is the coffee shop. I will be there.”

Aside from the heat and the tail-end of a dust storm that polished our faces, it was a perfect day at the ruins. As far as we could see, there were maybe ten other tourists at the entire site. Because Mr. Omar had dropped us off we didn’t have a tour guide to drag us around. We were able to explore Palmyra on our own schedule.

“Please stop. I speak English.”

First posted on the NAFSA blog

With great confidence, I strode purposefully to the counter of the patisserie and said, “Ithnaan al-qahwa min fa…” The young man working behind the counter raised his hands in front of him in a gesture that was both pleading and placating and, with very little trace of accent, said, “Please. Please stop. I speak English.”

Welcome to the first morning of my first day in Lebanon in the summer of 2009. Suddenly I was facing the prospect of having to travel around Lebanon equipped with Arabic skills that were not nearly as good as I had thought.

By the end of my month-long backpacking trip, which also included time in Syria, my spoken Arabic vastly improved from my fateful coffee-ordering experience – in fact, it  improved more in the short time I was in the two countries then it had over the entire 2 ½-year period that I had taken academic language classes.